Where to... Oslo Minus or Plus, or State and Independence?

Despite the unprecedented destruction and catastrophes witnessed by the war in Gaza, it did not result in a knockout for either party. A decisive victory was not achieved for Israel or the Palestinians. Victory is measured by three factors: breaking the will of one of the parties and their surrender, occupying enemy land, and inflicting heavy losses. The outcomes do not indicate the availability of these factors collectively or most of them at least; rather, it can be said that what was achieved is that the resistance stood firm and was not defeated, but it did not emerge victorious, nor did Israel. It failed to achieve its major objectives, even though it inflicted significant devastation and immense death toll.

In such a gray situation, the question becomes: where are we headed now? Towards a "deficient or surplus Oslo" or towards a federation consisting of the Gaza Strip, which enjoys some sovereign features, and populated enclaves in the West Bank, separated from each other, without Jerusalem, and lacking sovereign aspects, or towards a true Palestinian state?

To answer these questions, we must pause at some points. Firstly, there are factors that halted the war; the ceasefire was not coincidental but resulted from the interaction of essential factors, foremost among which is the legendary steadfastness of the Palestinian people who did not raise the white flag despite the catastrophe, nor did they revolt against the authority in the Strip, despite some protest manifestations, proving that they are committed to their existence in their homeland and to their rights, which cannot be defeated by killing or genocide. The armed resistance faced the Israeli war machine for two years, and remained standing despite the enormous losses it suffered, thwarting the aims of the occupation. Evidence of this is that it took over security and maintained public order after reaching a ceasefire agreement.

Additionally, there was the global solidarity movement with the Palestinians, which reached unprecedented and unexpected levels, impacting many governments, pushing them to impose sanctions on Israel, and changing Israel's image in global public opinion, revealing it as a colonial, racist, settler state cloaked in democracy, depicting it as a perpetrator and not a victim, while it is controlled by extremist, racist leaders, and its majority audience follows the Zionist movement which does not believe in historical compromises or solutions and does not recognize the existence of the Palestinian people or their rights, calling for the expulsion of as many as possible, and those who remain must believe in the Zionist narrative or be submissive to it without rights. This revolution forced Western governments to impose sanctions on the occupation, prompting the U.S. administration to move to save itself from isolation, and its ally from itself and those ruling it.

Moreover, regional countries reacted after Israel crossed all red lines, particularly targeting Qatar, the intermediary and U.S. ally, which demonstrated that Israel poses a threat to security and stability in the region, provoking unprecedented regional anger. The Trump administration also feared that the continuation of the war could threaten U.S. influence and projects in the Middle East, amidst a changing region and world and a fierce competition with China for world leadership.

In this context, internal Israeli crises worsened, as the war depleted itself and Israel suffered massive human, economic, and moral losses, with the government failing to achieve a clear decisive victory, facing public anger, the families of prisoners, sharp disagreements between politicians and military leaders, and between the government and opposition which saw the extremist right's persistence leading Israel into the unknown. The resistance found itself in a difficult position, facing two bitter options: if it rejected Trump's plan, it would be committing suicide and continue the genocide, and if it accepted it with its harsh conditions, it would surrender and seize the future of resistance and the cause. So it wisely chose to initially welcome it, to safeguard its people, while seeking to amend it through negotiation.

The second point is that the resistance has not been defeated, but it has not achieved its goals; it succeeded in surviving and preserving its will, but it did not secure a guaranteed permanent ceasefire, nor a complete Israeli withdrawal, nor a comprehensive lifting of the siege, nor the release of prisoners, nor the liberation of the occupied land, nor the protection of holy sites, nor an end to settlement, while the division deepened, and the genocide and schemes to liquidate the cause did not succeed in ending it, affecting the singular representation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, as there are thoughts of a colonial trusteeship council for Gaza without Palestinian representation, and meetings and conferences on the Palestinian cause are held without the participation of the sole legitimate representative, who praises them despite being excluded.

However, the repercussions of what happened, especially after the crimes committed by the Israeli forces, foremost among them genocide, displacement, and starvation, and the retaliation exceeding the reaction to "the Al-Aqsa Flood," have revived the Palestinian cause and imposed its centrality again on Arab regimes, gaining broad adoption of the Palestinian narrative across vast sectors worldwide, and making the recognition of the Palestinian state a near-universal consensus.

As for Israel, it failed to achieve its goals: liberating prisoners by force, eliminating "Hamas," displacing Palestinians from their homeland (the main goal), occupying and settling Gaza Strip, and annexing the West Bank, even though it inflicted devastation in Gaza, which yielded a quarter of a million martyrs, wounded, and missing persons. The war also revealed its internal fragility, weakening the myth of the "invincible army," without implying that the state of occupation has collapsed or is on the verge of collapse, but its continuity under the control of the expansionist colonial Zionist project that believes in wars and the logic that what power does not achieve, additional power will, will lead to its eventual demise, especially as it appeared dependent on the United States. Without it, it would suffer a severe defeat, and this will later reflect on its role, status, and importance in the American project in the region.

Tel Aviv also failed to achieve "shaping Palestinian consciousness"; despite death and destruction, a wide conviction solidified that Israel can be defeated through will, preparation, and organization. On the international level, Israel suffered a major moral defeat after it appeared before the world as a rogue state practicing genocide and ethnic cleansing, turning into a symbol of racism and colonial violence, while Palestine became the banner of freedom worldwide.

Concerning the post-war phase (the third point), a ceasefire does not mean the end of the war; rather, it indicates a truce that could be prolonged. The war may take on other forms differing from total destruction and genocide, akin to the Lebanese situation. However, it marks the beginning of a dangerous transitional political phase that could lead to one of two contradictory paths: either a "deficient Oslo," meaning a return to some limited self-governance under international, regional, or joint tutelage, distancing from international references for a potentially lengthy transitional period, lacking sovereignty and continued Israeli security control. This form could take the shape of trusteeship through a "management council," included in Trump's plan, with Arab and international parties participating, and it could end with involving the Palestinian authority after its "renewal" or take the shape of a federation that gathers Gaza Strip and some residential enclaves in the West Bank into a political entity without Jerusalem and without sovereignty. This scenario becomes likely if the Palestinian division persists, deepens, and expands, and amidst the absence of binding regional and international guarantees and interventions. The second path is that of true statehood and independence, which are possible if three essential conditions are met: Palestinian national unity within the framework of legitimate collective institutions or at least initially agreeing on a cohesive management with ideological, political, and party plurality far from dominance and exclusion, until free and fair elections are held with results respected, allowing the Palestinian people to choose their political project for the new phase and who represents them. And a realistic and revolutionary political vision should be available, striving to change the reality, not adapt to it, steering clear of prolonged realism without imagination and prolonged imagination disconnected from reality, based on the conviction that Palestine is in a strategic defensive phase. There should be consensus on a direct achievable national goal, such as keeping the cause alive, affirming Palestinian existence in its land, and thwarting colonial schemes to liquidate the Palestinian cause through annexation, displacement, settlement, and genocide, toward achieving the central national goal of defeating the occupation and realizing independence. This should rely on a form of struggle suited to the national goal (protecting the cause, the people, and independence), i.e., peaceful popular resistance, highlighting the importance of rights achievements, boycotts, sanctions, and legal accountability for Israel, while retaining the right to resistance in all its forms. Peace cannot be achieved without a fundamental change in Israel, which will only come through external pressure. The cause should not be diminished to the 1967 occupation; rather, work should pursue achieving sustainable peace through empowering the Palestinian people to exercise their right to self-determination and resolving the refugee issue justly, involving the right of return and compensation. Finally, continuous international and regional pressure should be established, linking reconstruction and funding to ending the occupation and establishing the Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as its capital.

The fourth point: Trump’s attempt to shape a new regional system incorporating Israel while preventing China's expansion in the Middle East, offering crumbs to the Palestinians. However, this project will surely face failure if Washington does not realize that Israel, small and unable to achieve a decisive military victory over the besieged, small Gaza, cannot lead the region. Only then will this project fail, and a new Palestinian opportunity could arise to thwart it, provided that the Palestinian national movement renews itself for the sake of its people, not a reform that aligns with hostile conditions asking it to accept the Zionist narrative or a new national movement is born, enabling the Palestinian leadership to possess a unified project, seeking and investing in political sagacity and bravery, adapting to regional and global changes instead of being beholden to them.

Finally: which path do we walk towards? The upcoming phase will determine whether we head towards a deficient "Oslo" or towards independence and statehood. Internal division and conflict will inevitably lead to the loss of the cause, at best to a non-sovereign entity, while national unity, based on a common program and clear goals, an appropriate form of struggle, and a genuine partnership, can open the way to a free, independent Palestinian state.