The Arabs in Israel.. What Fate?

Author: رامي منصور

The genocide war on the Gaza Strip has not changed the behavior of the political leadership, specifically the parliamentary leadership, of Arab citizens in Israel. In fact, it has reached a level of mediocrity that exceeds the buffoonery we've gotten used to for two decades. However, this weak and degraded behavior raises a real alarm bell that the fate of Arab citizens and the coming generations has become precarious and devoid of prospects, in light of the absence of any real and serious political vision. Meanwhile, Israel is heading towards a resolution of the issue of its Arab citizens as part of a resolution of the conflict with the Palestinians in general, through subjugation. This may be the most prominent term in Israeli policies in general: subjugation as a form of social and cultural genocide, embodied today by figures like Mansour Abbas, which is the result of a political, moral, and national distortion process that leads a person to insist on being a slave to the master, even though the master rejects him. Yet he persists and insists and insists on being a slave, while the master insists on his rejection.

The settlement of the issue of Arab citizens is not a recent or new concern after October 7, 2023, but has existed since the establishment of Israel. However, it took a different level after October 2000, namely after the second intifada, focusing on two levels: first, politically purging the national Arab leadership and creating new leaderships whose awareness and political culture do not extend beyond a broker mentality; second, geographically suffocating Arab towns to the extent that they turn into social internal time bombs in the form of crime, while being misled by neoliberal economic policies that superficially raise living standards, but primarily aim to destroy the social structures of society, whether at the level of family, extended family, or clan, undermining mutual internal trust, solidarity, and internal mutual assistance. These towns become like forests, devoid of social structures, internal trust, morals, or customs, and the option becomes individual refuge, embodying individualism, economic and social progress, and migration, albeit standing on the legs of a chicken – fragile, hollow, and without a bright future, but rather prone to explosion at any moment.

Thus, Israel seeks to resolve the issue of the interior - the Arab citizens - through politically purging the national leadership and destroying the community via the phenomena we experience daily, such as crime and the manifestations of consumption and false economic progress, which is paralleled by social regression hidden behind data such as the rising percentage of academics. However, the most crucial fact reflecting reality is that nearly half of the Arab community lives below the poverty line, with 39 percent of Arab families living in poverty, according to official Israeli data for 2023. During the current war, economic conditions have worsened; poverty does not only mean deteriorating economic conditions but also reflects a deteriorating social, cultural, educational, and health level. What is the benefit of false economic or living progress, even if it is real for a certain segment, in a society drowning in poverty in all its meanings?

This is the reality we live, despite the appearances of economic progress, which is based on providing services, food, and selling clothes. Yet we are a poor community bleeding, and our towns have become unsuitable for decent living, human reservoirs, lacking any components of physical, psychological, educational, or cultural health, with no future, shrinking and waiting for a massive internal explosion.

A poor community governed by criminal gangs, and poverty has become a source of nourishment for this crime, firstly by providing "soldiers" for these gangs, and secondly through borrowing from the "black market".

The problem is not in poverty in its material economic sense but in its educational, cultural, and national meanings. The aim of politically purging the national leadership and targeting it, along with the policies of impoverishment, land confiscation, and urban suffocation, is not solely to resolve the issue of Arab citizens but to strike at national identity, subjugation through distortion. The national identity here does not refer to political stances but to belonging, or the feeling of belonging to a group that has a common past and destiny, with a single great goal. What is our common goal?

Political leaders, specifically parliamentary ones, provide different answers, but these do not rise to the level of the question. Their current political agendas do not go beyond political tactics before the upcoming parliamentary elections: should we participate in the elections with a single list or with two lists? While parliamentary representation is crucial and necessary, this behavior does not carry a serious political project, nor does it define a significant common goal. The big common goal is condensed into identity, national identity, and not merely preserving identity; we have surpassed this stage in a negative sense. Rather, we need to rebuild this collective national identity, especially in light of the genocide in Gaza. We cannot continue in the state of denial we find ourselves in regarding what is happening in Gaza; this could turn into ingratitude, making us a hollow trivial group, without morals or values, materially, culturally, and educationally poor, assuming the role of the wealthy through displays of consumption, showiness, and empty material boasting.

What came after October 7 was not a flood; it was an existential and emotional earthquake whose aftershocks we feel in all aspects of our lives. Rising from it requires a deeper process of building than the prevailing and poor political discourse embodied by the state of Mansour Abbas.

Rising in a poor community requires collaborative work to build a cohesive group towards a noble shared goal, interconnected by shared identity and belonging. But what is the common goal?

The answer should be with the politicians and political movements. If the answer starts from the base of building identity and belonging, the road to the answer becomes accessible.

Figures like Mansour Abbas do not provide an answer, even if he believes he carries a project; he aligns with Bezalel Smotrich in his approach. The latter builds his doctrine – the doctrine of resolution – on the doctrine of Joshua bin Nun, proposing three options to his enemy: either subjugation – slavery, or extermination, or displacement – forced migration. This Abbas has preferred the first option.

The essential line of defense against attempts to settle the fate of Arabs in the interior through distortion and impoverishment remains identity and belonging. As for the other proposals regarding discourse that transcends national rights and identity, we have tried them in recent years, and all have failed.