Gaza or Two Gazas

Statements from U.S. Vice President "J.D. Vance" and President Jared Kushner's envoy regarding the reconstruction of areas controlled by Israeli occupation forces reveal the likelihood of implementing a scenario that divides the Gaza Strip into two parts, "two Gazas." One part, under the control of Hamas, lies west of the yellow line and hosts most of the Palestinian population (both residents and internally displaced people from areas occupied by Israeli forces). The second part, located east of the yellow line, is controlled by Israeli forces and is almost devoid of Palestinians.

Achieving a balance between the desire for reconstruction without allowing Hamas to pose a threat, as stated by "Vance," acknowledges the continued rule of Hamas in the western part of the Gaza Strip but in a manner that is besieged, isolated, and rejected, unable to meet the needs of its citizens or undertake reconstruction. At the same time, it will be weak and incapable of fighting or impacting Israel's security while an exclusion zone controlled by Israeli forces or international forces (the "International Stabilization Force") exists. This situation aligns with the provisions of Clause 17 in Trump's plan to end the war in Gaza, issued on 29/9/2025, stating, "If Hamas delays or rejects this proposal, the previous agreements, including the expansion of assistance operations, will be applied in areas free from terrorism that are transferred from the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to the International Stabilization Force (ISF)." In other words, this means stripping Hamas of the ability to govern from one side, transferring residents to populated areas providing services ("housing, education, and health") on the other, creating job opportunities in those areas, and inciting against Hamas's rule in western Gaza.

This current scenario implies a permanent loss of Palestinian land and turns the International Stabilization Force from a force to resolve the crisis to one that sustains it—or, in other terms, to an additional occupation, which is something the Arab countries do not desire. They have expressed concerns about changing its mission from assisting Palestinian security forces to bolster its governance and achieve peace to a force imposing peace and disarmament, two different matters that all Palestinians need to assess the existing risks and impending disaster, and derive effective means to restore their project for independence and exercise their right to self-determination.

Understanding the U.S. stance on the issue of ending the war (“broad military operations”) necessitates delving into the mindset of the current U.S. administration and its president to clarify their intentions. Originally, Trump's plan is open to establishing the aforementioned scenario and other possibilities according to realities, impacts, and potential changes; President Donald Trump's decisions are linked to a myriad of mixed, interrelated factors, as well as his volatile personality and desire to appear distinct from previous U.S. presidents.

In my opinion, the mixture of interests and ambitions that he has shaped directly and indirectly influences his decision as driving factors for achieving stability (“peace”), primarily (1) achieving the "America First" slogan and restoring its greatness through bolstering the economy and funding the American renaissance, which is related to the need for Gulf investment funds inside the U.S., as was the case during his visit to the major Gulf states this year on one hand, and the desire not to incur expenses outside the U.S. (“to fund wars as his predecessor Joe Biden did”) in line with the traditional isolationist stance of the Republican Party on the other. (2) Expanding the "Abraham Accords," which is part of the major political legacy in the American president's foreign policy record, provided an agreement is reached between Israel and Saudi Arabia—the gateway to the Arab and Islamic worlds (similar to Jimmy Carter in the Camp David Accords or Bill Clinton in the Oslo Accords and Wadi Araba).

And (3) achieving personal glory by winning the Nobel Peace Prize; this is a central point in President Donald Trump's thinking alongside American presidents, especially Barack Obama, whom he publicly mocked. And (4) changes within American public opinion showing that support for Israel will not be a decisive factor as a driver for voting in American elections, which affects the chances of Republican candidates in the upcoming midterm elections for Congress and, of course, for state-level councils. And (5) attempting to rescue Israel from the crystallizing isolation on global and international levels, from the madness of force that it resorts to in its behavior, while maintaining this advanced American base in the Middle East.

Now is the time, regardless of American and Israeli intentions and actions, for the Palestinian factions, gathered in Cairo today, to carefully consider and maximize the needs of citizens who remain forever. As for the factions, parties, and political forces, they are tools of framing resistance and governance that will eventually fade away; they change in forms and natures, alter their policies and orientations, shift in their popular status, and even change their ideological and intellectual motives.

It is indeed time for the Palestinian action to return to relying on reason and the interests of the Palestinians, and to break through the orchestrated external machinations of a new political catastrophe by dividing the Gaza Strip after the humanitarian disaster that has befallen Palestinians there, to maintain one Gaza and prevent the formation of two. It is indeed time for Hamas to exhibit reason and prudence in relinquishing narrow party interests by handing over governance to the Palestinian Authority as an acceptable actor to continue the internationally accepted two-state solution path. It is indeed time for the Palestinian Authority and Fatah to demonstrate wisdom and sagacity to unite Palestinians and preserve what remains of Palestinian capability, setting aside narrow views of governance and unilateral control.