Open War: The Latest Israeli Strategy

Regardless of the outcome of the meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and U.S. President Donald Trump, following the latest thoughts of analysts close to the ruling right-wing coalition, it is clear that they continue to entrench their notion of Israeli national security. They emphasize that this is derived from the new realities and field developments, attempting to adopt another concept within a broader geographic context, and from a critical offensive perspective that targets several entities, primarily the security institution.

In general, it can be said that the two main conclusions reached are expected to significantly impact the new concept of Israeli national security: First, the necessity to transition to what is described as a "decisive strategy". According to one security expert, since the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, Israel has adopted a strategy of deterrence and refrained from asking the military to decisively resolve confrontations against non-state organizations, like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. During this period, there was a unique exception regarding the adoption of a decisive strategy against Palestinians, represented by the Operation Protective Wall in 2002, and several subsequent operations aimed at reinforcing the achievements of that operation; however, it remained confined within the territory of the West Bank. The reference to "Protective Wall" here is important because, in this expert's view, as well as others’, it paved the way for the return of operational and intelligence control by the Israeli army over the areas of the West Bank, and enabled the establishment of the "separation barrier," thus forcing the Palestinian Authority back to the negotiating table and security cooperation with Israel. In light of this, relative security was achieved in this arena.

On the other hand, the purpose of recalling it is to remind of the mechanism required to achieve a decisive outcome followed by a relatively long-term calm, which is the use of significant ground forces alongside limited use of air force and heavy artillery fire, along with readiness to control the land for a long period.

The second conclusion is that using a deterrent strategy against quasi-state organizations, like Hamas and Hezbollah, is more complex and difficult to implement compared to deterrence against states. Even if periods of calm prevail under this strategic framework, this does not resolve the fundamental problems of the organizations but merely seems to allow the possibility of resuming acts of resistance in the future.

It can be said that these two conclusions could explain the transformation of open warfare, particularly in Gaza, into an Israeli strategy, alongside avoiding any clear strategic vision regarding the future, which means maintaining the conflict without specifying a clear goal or timeframe.

It seems that the most important message behind this approach, as phrased by a right-wing Israeli historian in the "Israel Hayom" newspaper a few days ago, is that Israel will remain in a state of open war in its border areas and will not allow any military activity in these areas, which include the borders with Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank, as well as the Gaza Strip, which will remain in the crosshairs of Israeli decisive strategy until further notice. This historian also calls, in what can be considered a threatening tone, for the use of war strategy concerning all matters related to the border areas with Egypt and Jordan, which is what was meant by the earlier reference to the broader geographic context.

In this regard, he wrote that after the October 7 (2023) attack, Israel cannot allow the existence of any "terrorist" organizations in its border areas. It must continue to activate its new doctrine that stipulates attacking any organization encroaching on "terrorist" groups, as is its practice in the West Bank, southern Lebanon, and Syria, and it must declare that this doctrine applies to both Jordan and Egypt if it feels that such organizations are beginning to emerge in the border regions with them.