The American 'Peace Council'… Israel Has Not Left Gaza, But Its Role Has Changed

Israeli analyses increasingly suggest that the formation of the so-called "American Peace Council" represents a pivotal moment for the future of the Gaza Strip, and even for Israel's own position within the region. According to this reading, Donald Trump perceives Gaza as a completely separate entity from Israel, having been internationalized by virtue of the de facto situation, and Israel is no longer a partner in it but rather a party excluded from the second phase of negotiations. These analyses assume that Gaza is evolving into an independent entity not aligned with any state, to be managed by a technocratic Palestinian-regional committee, involving Turkey and Egypt, under the supervision of an international executive council. Meanwhile, Israel's role would be limited to opening crossings for goods and carrying out targeted military strikes when necessary. According to this logic, Israel has no more to offer in Gaza, and its role there has come to an end, as Qatar has been marginalized and Netanyahu has been excluded from the decision-making center. However, this conclusion, although it reflects a real shift in Israel's role, goes too far in declaring its "end." It is true that Israel is no longer the exclusive player in Gaza, and that the post-war phase has freed the region from being a place of direct military administration or absolute Israeli political dominance. It is also true that Washington, under Trump, is redistributing regional roles, granting Turkey and Egypt central positions in the arrangements for Gaza and Syria, at the expense of the traditional Israeli role. Nonetheless, the diminishing role does not mean its disappearance. Israel has not been excluded from Gaza; rather, its position has been redefined: from a direct decision-maker to a functional tool. Control is no longer overt, but it has not been abolished. Control over the crossings, airspace, and maritime boundaries, along with the right to intervene militarily "when necessary," are not secondary details but rather the essence of actual sovereignty. The power that determines the rhythm of security, the economy, and daily life has not left the scene. The Israeli reading that discusses Trump's choice of Erdogan as the "man of the Middle East" holds a certain degree of truth, but it conceals a more problematic aspect: Washington is not replacing Israel, but rather repurposing it. Turkey and Egypt are tasked with administration, reconstruction, and stability control, while Israel remains the ultimate security guarantor, without bearing the costs of direct occupation or its political repercussions. Here lies the essence of the transformation: transferring the burden of Gaza from Israel to the region, while maintaining the instruments of dominance in its hands. The notion of an inevitable Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, along with from Syria and Lebanon, seems closer to a desire than an analysis. The Israeli experience indicates that withdrawal only occurs when control can be ensured by other means. What is happening today does not contradict this pattern; rather, it reproduces it in a less costly and more pragmatic form. The Palestinian Authority, which these analyses claim will return to Gaza, is not returning as a sovereign entity but as part of a constrained management system, operating under international-regional security ceilings, and in the face of continuous Israeli capacity for disruption or intervention. Hamas, which is supposed to remain without disarmament, will be pushed towards functional integration rather than political, transforming it from a resistant actor into an internal control element. In this sense, the failure of Israeli war objectives does not signify a political victory for the Palestinians, but rather a transition to a more complex and dangerous phase: a phase where control is reshaped not through tanks but via committees, councils, and spheres of influence. Here the deeper danger emerges: what is occurring does not target Gaza alone, but the Palestinian national project itself. Gaza is not only being separated from Israel but also from Palestinian politics, and is being managed through technocratic formulas that empty the idea of state of its essence. The proposed technocratic committee is not a transitional solution but a substitute for the political project. It is an executive service body that receives its decisions from an ambiguous international-regional executive council, not subject to Palestinian accountability, and operating under the logic of "stability" rather than liberation. This ambiguity is not incidental but part of a model based on administration without politics and authority without sovereignty. In this sense, the "Peace Council" does not pave the way for the establishment of a Palestinian state but instead opens the door for its dismantling through "administrative solutions": Gaza as a unit managed internationally, and the West Bank on a parallel fragmentation path, while Israel retains the right to intervene and disrupt whenever it wishes, without bearing the costs of occupation. Even the talk of marginalizing Qatar or removing Israel from the scene does not mean the end of hegemony, but a redistribution of its tools. Control is not exercised only through military force but also via councils, financing conditions, and security criteria. Thus, the disagreement with Israeli analyses lies not in the description of the transformation but in its conclusion. Israel has not ended its role in Gaza. What has ended is an old form of control, to be replaced by a softer, more dangerous form. The upcoming phase requires a deep Palestinian awareness of the dangers of this path, reinstating the importance of political representation, and preventing the issue from being reduced to managing life affairs under occupation. The "next day" may not be a transition to statehood, but a permanent entrenchment of a status quo without war, without peace, and without sovereignty.