The Palestinian Cause... Between the Dangers of Guardianship and Opportunities for National Unity

The question posed after the UN Security Council's decision granting international legitimacy for American guardianship over the Gaza Strip is: How can this situation be handled in a way that minimizes its harms and maximizes the available opportunities within it? It is not a given that the decision will be implemented, or that it will be applied in its worst forms, especially since the issues it addresses are extremely complex, and the parties responsible for its implementation do not move according to the same motivations and goals. One group wants to stabilize the ceasefire, withdraw Israeli forces, stop displacement, facilitate humanitarian aid, open the Rafah crossing, initiate reconstruction, remove Hamas from power, and return authority, opening a reliable political path to establish the Palestinian state. The other group seeks to maintain the occupation, even in buffer zones, Israeli control, and the right to intervene and attack whenever deemed appropriate, as well as to open the door to displacement and establish a "Gaza Riviera," keeping Hamas out of governance and disarming it, preventing the return of the authority, and establishing a Palestinian governance that is subject to occupation, although the upper hand is expected to belong to the White House, as Trump, an ally of Israel, is anticipated to chair the "Council of Peace" and control the activities of the "Stability Forces."

Israel began to support the decision because it meets the essence of its demands and because it cannot oppose Trump, but it did so reluctantly. International oversight of Gaza, even if led by a biased American force, is not its preferred option because it restricts the freedom of its army and makes its behavior subject to the will of the "Council of Peace" that aligns with the interests of the State of Israel and does not align with the ambitions of the ruling far-right. Netanyahu's government aims through the war to entrench occupation and settlement, displace Palestinians, disarm Gaza, solidify its separation from the West Bank, overthrow Hamas's rule, and impose a new Palestinian governance that is loyal to it and disconnected from both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, unless it is reconstituted in accordance with Israeli-American "reform" conditions that would make it, if it responds, devoid of national representation. Therefore, Israel prefers to implement its goals itself to ensure the fall of Hamas's rule and its disarmament and to keep the doors of displacement, occupation, settlement, and annexation open, as it does not trust that the movement will respond to the demands of the "Council of Peace," nor that it is capable of enforcing them, and because it fears subsequent attempts to generalize the Gaza model to the West Bank, as well as fears changes in the American stance towards Hamas, where the White House might agree to its continued existence in exchange for conditions including its commitment to maintaining security, as pointed out by Mousa Abu Marzouk. Such a scenario is unlikely but possible in the absence of a quick alternative to Hamas's authority.

Israel's doubts increase because the "Council of Peace" has not yet been formed, and perhaps it will involve figures from countries that are undesirable for it. Moreover, the Stability Force has not yet been established amid Arab-Islamic hesitance to participate for fear of clashing with resistance factions. As the formation of the force falters, the occupation continues to impose new facts on the ground; the war continues despite the ceasefire, even under the umbrella of genocide, total destruction, and forced displacement. Delays in forming the Stability Force, Hamas's continued rule, and unresolved matters of disarmament could lead the occupation to delay the introduction of aid, open the Rafah crossing, and begin reconstruction. This may lead to the practical division of Gaza between eastern and western regions, with the relatively occupied western areas receiving "privileges" and calculated rebuilding, while the eastern regions remain under siege and aggression, pushing the residents to migrate westward in a "voluntary" displacement process.

The Palestinian police are unprepared, and there are plans to train three thousand policemen in the first batch to replace the current police, which is rejected (according to the Israeli perspective) and considered aligned with Hamas. As for the technocratic committee, there is a Palestinian-Egyptian agreement to form it under the leadership of a minister from the Palestinian government with a national reference, but the government hesitates to implement it, waiting for Hamas's position on surrendering arms to the authority, even though it is not recognized, for fear of contradicting the "Council of Peace" and Israel, both of which demand that the movement relinquish power and disarm, and make extensive political "reforms" before any role for the authority. For these reasons, Israel bets on the failure of the implementation of the decision so that it can continue its war, relying on local client militias, and acts as if the decision does not exist.

It is not enough for the Palestinian Authority to welcome the decision and for Hamas and other factions to oppose it; rather, the varying positions can be utilized to link the issue of disarmament to progress towards a reliable path for establishing the Palestinian state. The absence of consensus warns of the success of the hostile plan and deepens the division and generalization of it, potentially leading to armed confrontations. The Palestinian option today is not between a good scenario and a bad one, but between the bad and the worse. What is needed is to minimize losses and avoid confrontation with the international community, especially since the decision enjoys wide Arab, Islamic, and international support, despite differing motivations of the supporting countries. There is an international camp that sees the decision as a step towards a Palestinian state, ending the war, withdrawal, reconstruction, and halting displacement, contrary to another camp led by Netanyahu's American-backed approach, which seeks displacement and preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state, as it poses an existential threat, as viewed by the Israeli government and opposition.

The worst that could happen is the failure to implement the decision without a better alternative, as this would mean the continuation of war and possibly its expansion. The successful implementation of the decision, despite its shortcomings, could be the least worst scenario, but it necessitates Palestinian consensus accompanied by painful concessions, despite insufficient guarantees of Israel's commitment to ceasefire, withdrawal, humanitarian aid entry, reconstruction, prevention of displacement, and engagement in a reliable political path. The likely outcome here, if unexpected developments do not occur, is a political solution that includes less than a state and more than autonomy, granting some appearances of sovereignty in Gaza and linking separated enclaves in the West Bank, which is a modified version of "Oslo."

If the Palestinians agreed on the goal of ending the occupation and realizing independence and activated the leadership framework of the Liberation Organization, or formed a government of reconciliation or a support committee, or even held the authority fully accountable while ensuring pluralism, commitment to elections, and organizing arms, that would be stronger than the division that wastes everything. Unity or even reconciliation at a low ceiling is better than division under very low or very high ceilings.

It is true that Israel has become morally and politically naked after two years of war, and its strategic position has deteriorated, to the point that it has become closer to an American protectorate, but it is necessary to differentiate between its current power (political, military, and economic) and the future of this power, which has no guarantee. Its continuation as a colonial, racist force hostile to the peoples and countries of the region and an element of instability, and the ongoing war threatens its security and perhaps its existence in the future, will gradually turn it into an increasingly strategic burden on its supporters.

The assertion that consensus between the "resistance and compromise teams" is impossible deepens the division and ignores that the ceiling of internal Palestinian dialogue has dropped significantly amid the egregious imbalance in the power equation; as public solidarity with the Palestinian cause has not been reflected in the battleground where maps are drawn and decisions made. Despite the significant mistakes of the ruling leadership within the authority and the organization and its large concessions, its reliance on a strategy of survival for itself before anything else, and its lack of responsiveness to unity initiatives, the Zionist project targets all Palestinians without exception, even those cooperating with it, as evident in policies aimed at undermining the authority and calls for its dissolution and the arrest of its head for practicing "diplomatic terrorism" while resistance practices "military terrorism." The Israeli "reform" conditions placed on the authority, in complete disregard for the organization as if it did not exist (including changes in curricula, halting media incitement, stopping internationalization and pursuing Israel in international institutions and courts, not seeking recognition from states of the Palestinian state, dismantling the foundations of Palestinian identity and narrative, to demands to abandon the right of return, stopping salaries for prisoners and families of martyrs, and recognizing Israel's right to exist as a state for the Jewish people exclusively) clarify that Israel opposes simply the existence of a unified Palestinian national identity and does not distinguish much between moderates and extremists, treating Palestinians as individuals rather than a people, who must choose between migration, servitude, or death.

Despite the deficiencies of the ruling leadership, the security cooperation of the authority with the occupation, its economic subservience, and its acceptance of adapting to the security-economic ceiling of its relationship with the occupation, Fatah (the pillar of the authority and organization) remains a fundamental component of the national movement, cannot be discarded, especially with the symbolism of leaders like Marwan Barghouti, who can (as most Palestinians from both resistance and compromise teams acknowledge) revive national unity. If the authority fulfills its required obligations, it removes itself from the national ranks, and then calls to transcend and topple it become valid.

Accusing others of betrayal is easy, as is excommunication, but the consequences of both are very serious. National unity that includes various classes, directions, and individuals, excluding collaborators, as proven by the experiences of liberation movements from Algeria to Vietnam to South Africa and the experience of the Palestinian people itself, is a condition for victory. If it cannot be organized from top to bottom, let it begin from the grassroots level upwards, based on a minimum program, not a maximum one. The lack of unity does not prevent anyone from presenting a model in awareness and practice that can be emulated by various forces and movements.

Radical change is necessary and urgent, but it requires leadership, an idea, a program, a broad national front, clear popular support, and multi-dimensional struggles aimed at achieving victory, not just keeping the flame of resistance alive. It requires a favorable Arab, regional, and international strategic environment, not merely media speeches and revolutionary slogans that incite internal tensions. Historical experiences (from the 1967 defeat, which changed Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Arab regimes' stance from skepticism about the Palestinian revolution to supporting it, to the Battle of Karameh in 1968, which marked the second great launch of the Palestinian revolution and led to overwhelming support for it, opening doors to change in the leadership of the Liberation Organization, to 1973 whose results, specifically the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, paved the way for negotiations and settlements that ended with "Oslo," and into what we endure now) confirm that major strategic changes come from the maturation of self and external factors for change and the occurrence of major changes that have already occurred or are surely on their way to happening, as well as from a precise reading of reality and its possibilities and probabilities, not from hopes projected onto reality.