
What Comes Next: Partial or Comprehensive Deal or Escalation?
After the partial deal regarding Gaza seemed within reach, and the gaps of disagreement over withdrawal maps, prisoner exchanges, humanitarian aid, and guarantees shrank, U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff unexpectedly escalated the situation following his meeting with the minister closest to Benjamin Netanyahu, Ron Dermer, claiming that Hamas “failed the negotiations,” and hinted at the existence of “other options.” He then began promoting the idea of shifting from a partial deal to a comprehensive deal, under the threat of: either Hamas agrees to the proposed conditions, or the suffocating blockade on the areas yet to be occupied would be tightened, and perhaps even their occupation, despite the Israeli army’s opposition, which recognizes that any new invasion would take a long time to achieve the set goals, and that it requires significant troop reinforcements for the forces operating in the sector, at a time when the occupying army is exhausted, and its assessment is that the war has exhausted its purposes, and the invasion would put the lives of Israeli prisoners at great risk, inflicting substantial losses on the occupying forces, and could ultimately lead to a quagmire of a prolonged war of attrition, occupation of the sector, and the imposition of direct military rule over it, which would exacerbate the isolation and anger directed towards the state of occupation and increase the likelihood of serious sanctions being imposed on it.
There is a collective Palestinian exit that has not been considered, achieved through the official leadership providing an exit for Hamas, allowing it to participate in the political system.
To grasp the secret behind the significant shift that occurred during the last two weeks, we notice that the world has been alarmed and preoccupied with the reality of what is happening in the sector, characterized by extermination and systematic starvation that has led to the deaths of hundreds of civilians from hunger, threatening the lives of hundreds of thousands in a war that has begun using hunger as a pressure tool to achieve what military warfare and extermination and displacement have failed to accomplish. The plans to build the “inhumane city” in the southern sector, or the other “inhumane and safe areas” were nothing but an expression of a hidden intention to enforce forced displacement as one of the objectives of the war, an objective whose mention (like annexation) is not merely tactical maneuvers aimed at changing Hamas’s position, and the position of the other resistance factions. Just as Israel denied the Nakba of 1948, it today denies the Nakba of starvation and famine that has turned aid distribution centers, established by the "inhumane Gaza organization", into death traps. Thousands of civilians were forced to crowd and obtain food within only eight minutes, distributed among four distribution centers, which has led to the martyrdom of more than 1300 people until the writing of these lines, and the injury of nearly seven thousand others.
Although the indicators pointed towards Netanyahu’s desire to complete the deal, while fearing it at the same time, especially to please Donald Trump who was pushing for the deal, and gaining electoral points after the Iranian-Israeli war, portraying that it dealt fatal blows to Iran, this was later revealed to be true, as Israel also suffered unprecedented strong hits, and the Iranian regime remained steadfast in its previous positions, with the same demands still on the table. And because the internal Israeli opposition to the continuation of the war is increasing, including Haredi rejection of conscription, the growing phenomenon of refusing military service, the human losses of the army, and the ongoing and increasing suicide cases among soldiers who participated in the war, and the military establishment leaning towards the option of a partial deal. On one hand, on the other side, the complex political calculations after the starvation war led to Israel’s image in the world being at its lowest, even among its closest allies, with the increasing use of terms like "genocide", "apartheid", and "famine" to describe its actions. This scene, in addition to the “tsunami” of recognizing the Palestinian state, which included major countries: France, Canada, Britain, constituted a political shock for the extreme right government in Israel, and made Netanyahu retreat from his intention to resort to early elections out of fear of losing them, requiring the extension of his government longer than he thought after the "victory" over Iran, and he began betting on escalating the war, because the partial deal could lead to a ceasefire in the presence of Hamas, which would be considered a defeat leading to assured loss in the elections, and difficult accounting from the investigative committee that will investigate the historical failure on "October 7" (2023), and the greater failure in not completing the achievement of the goals and stopping the war, despite nearly 22 months since its outbreak, thus he seeks a partial deal under his conditions or a war escalation after attempting to break the intensity of international criticism by allowing for a degree of humanitarian aid.
There is an Israeli bet, sanctioned by the Americans, on the collapse of the resistance and its surrender, due to public and political pressures, or the possibility of freeing the prisoners by force.
From Netanyahu and his government's perspective, it seems as if the world is "rewarding Hamas" and the Palestinians by recognizing a Palestinian state, despite all the unjust conditions imposed on the Palestinians, including calls for disarmament and the exclusion of Hamas from power, which were included in the New York declaration, while no conditions are imposed on Israel, the state that violates international law and has committed all kinds of crimes, and includes ministers who propose ideas about extermination and forced displacement and annexation of other lands. From Washington’s side, the American position has shifted, as reported by an Egyptian official, stating that Washington is less engaged in pressuring Israel to stop the war, and the tone of American officials has changed, focusing on demanding Hamas’s surrender, rejecting negotiations that would lead to a temporary ceasefire, while promoting a comprehensive deal that does not include Israeli withdrawal, nor guarantees any limit to extermination and annexation and displacement, but includes impossible conditions, such as giving Hamas a deadline to release the Israeli prisoners immediately, without any counterpart, disarming Hamas and removing it from the political scene, and handing over governance to the United States without the Palestinian Authority or the Community Support Committee. This is a proposal that does not open the path for negotiations, but is considered a recipe for surrender, not for settlement, and has limited chances of success unless it is significantly amended, and would face opposition even from Arab countries, Turkey, Canada, and Europe, who support the return of the authority after its renewal to Gaza, to implement what they have pledged about establishing the Palestinian state.
This shift also came against the backdrop of Trump’s and his party’s declining popularity as a result of the Gaza war and other factors, his involvement in the Epstein scandal which is being used to pressure him, in order to diminish any potential influence he might have on the Israeli position. Is military escalation the only scenario?... No, many factors pushing towards the partial deal still exist, the most important being that the gap between the two positions is small, as evidenced by discussions about giving Washington and Israel a deadline for Hamas, even if short. Military escalation does not have a magic wand, whether in the form of a tighter blockade, or occupying new sites, or occupying what remains of unoccupied land. There is a real race between three pathways: a partial deal that is still on the table despite being currently distant from the negotiating table, a comprehensive deal that seems unattainable if not amended, and may use a tactic to pressure Hamas into making new concessions, as the gap between the two positions regarding the comprehensive deal is very wide, and there is also an Israeli bet supported by the U.S. on the collapse of the resistance and its surrender, due to Palestinian and Arab public and political pressures, or the possibility of freeing the prisoners by force without negotiation.
Hamas’s options appear limited; it has practically agreed to Witkoff’s proposal, with remaining issues that can be agreed upon, but it was surprised by the collapse of negotiations as the agreement approached completion. If it ultimately agrees to the new Israeli and American conditions, it will seem like it has surrendered and declared its defeat; if it rejects them, it will be blamed for any forthcoming escalation.
Hamas will not surrender, for surrender does not guarantee the end of the war, which does not target it only, but aims at liquidating the Palestinian cause.
There is a collective Palestinian exit that has not been considered, achieved through the official leadership providing an exit for Hamas, allowing it to participate in the political system, and in return, Hamas shows more flexibility, leading to a single Palestinian leadership and a single institution based first on Palestinian legitimacy, and second on Arab and international legitimacy. Hamas has made significant concessions, including agreeing to the partial deal despite the likelihood of war resuming after the end of the 60-day truce, and nearing approval on maps that keep the occupying forces present over more than 20% of Gaza's area, with the remaining dispute over tens or hundreds of meters, and the release of 200 prisoners in exchange for ten Israelis, despite having previously released 500 in exchange for the same number, and it accepted handing over governance to the Community Support Committee as soon as the 60-day truce began, relying only on American guarantees for this truce, without insisting on guarantees to prevent the resumption of war, and it cannot offer more, as it will not surrender, especially since surrender does not guarantee the end of the war, which targets not only Hamas but aims to liquidate the Palestinian cause in all its components, including displacement and annexation, and surrender is not guaranteed to stop the war, and could whet the appetite of the occupying state to continue implementing its declared and undeclared goals.
Stopping extermination should be the top priority because it opens the way to halt displacement and annexation and preserves the resistance’s existence; without the people being on their land, there can be no resistance, and it brings the Palestinian issue back to its correct path: ending the occupation and realizing freedom and independence. This requires building on the international movement supporting the recognition of the Palestinian state, despite the unjust conditions involved, and working to form a unified national leadership, one political program, and one weapon that fulfills its duty to defend the homeland and the citizen, serving and committing to the national strategy and the decisions of the unified legitimate national institutions.

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