Election Decree and the Palestinian Predicament: Between the Need for Reform and the Risks of Exclusion

Author: هاني المصري

In a somewhat surprising move, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree on July 19 calling for elections for the Palestinian National Council before the end of the year, without any mention of presidential or legislative elections. The peculiarity of the decree lies in its contradiction to a letter the president sent on June 9 to both French President Macron and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, which included commitments regarding the prisoners' salaries, transforming them into a social rather than a struggle issue, educational curricula, halting alleged incitement, disarming Hamas and removing it from governance, seeking assistance from Arab and foreign forces, as well as a commitment to hold presidential and legislative elections within a year, in which only those who accept the PLO's program and commitments and believe in a single authority and single weapon would participate.

At first glance, there may seem to be no difference between calling for elections of the National Council and elections for the presidency and the legislative council. However, the difference is substantial in terms of priorities, whether the priority is for the organization, or the authority, or whether to adopt an approach that integrates both the organization and the authority simultaneously and in parallel. This raises the question of whether unity is an entry point to elections, ensuring competition within a unified framework, accepted by all other parties, or whether elections are an entry point to unity, with elections first being a means to employ it as a tool for decisiveness and exclusion of others, rather than uniting them against the occupation and its plans. Unity can only be achieved on the basis of a common national program for a simple but extremely important reason: Palestine is under occupation and is undergoing a national liberation phase that necessitates a national front to achieve liberation.

The decree on the elections was issued by President Abbas unilaterally without any national consultation, which undermines its legitimacy and deprives it of the necessary political cover.

Before the issuance of this decree, it was implicitly understood that members of the legislative council naturally are members of the national council, meaning they represent the interior, along with proportional representation for Palestinians abroad, while the formation of the council would be completed according to standards that guarantee the representation of various sectors and factions, including those that do not exceed the election threshold, in addition to independent national figures. The national agreement, expressed by a decision from the National Council in its 23rd session held in 2018, was that the interior would be represented by 150 members and the exterior by 200 members. However, according to the current decree, two-thirds of the members of the National Council, which will consist of 350 members, will be from the interior, while the remaining third will represent the outside and the diaspora, despite the fact that the Palestinian people are nearly divided equally between the interior and the exterior. This reflects spontaneity and carelessness without justification or explanation.

The first of the possible scenarios is that the decree is not serious but falls within political maneuvers aimed at buying time and distracting Palestinians and those interested in them, reminding of the existence of the organization and the need to involve it in post-war arrangements in Gaza, especially following its continuous marginalization by regional and international forces. The organization itself has contributed to its own marginalization through a policy of neutrality, waiting, and adapting to the realities and facts established by the occupation while adopting a survival strategy before and after October 7, 2023. This scenario is reinforced by the weakness of the Palestinian leadership and the absence of genuine will to face challenges, foremost among them the Israeli position rejecting any role for the authority or the organization, as well as the absence of a cohesive opposition providing a viable alternative based on new visions and strategies capable of achieving victory. The intention to announce elections, then to excuse obstacles, leads to no actual intention to hold them, later justifying obstacles, either Israeli (especially in Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip amidst ongoing war and its repercussions) or internal obstacles (such as Hamas preventing them or refusing to participate, expecting that it will remain an effective party in the sector to some extent), leading to another postponement of the elections.

Unity cannot be achieved except on the basis of a common national program for a simple but extremely important reason: Palestine is under occupation.

The second scenario is that obstacles may be circumvented by forming the new national council through appointment, as was done previously (with the difference being that the organization was previously in a phase of resurgence and enjoyed legitimacy stemming from the national program, resistance, and consensus among various forces), while introducing representatives from unions and syndicates under the pretext that they are elected, as a "temporary solution" until conditions for holding elections are met. Although this scenario is possible, it is currently unlikely.

The third scenario is weak in the foreseeable future, but its analysis is necessary for scientific and objective purposes. It assumes that the decree will lead to stirring stagnant waters and open the way toward national reconciliation that includes the formation of a competencies government, implementation of the remaining components of the Beijing Declaration (July 23, 2024), or a community support committee, provided that in both cases there is a national reference represented in the PLO, represented by the temporary leadership framework until the elections are held, a support committee or government tasked with preparing for free and fair elections within the framework of comprehensive reform of the organization's institutions. Ideally, a national reconciliation government should be established, as it would be more capable and legitimate.

There are reasons to object to the decree. First, it was issued unilaterally without any national consultation, which undermines its legitimacy and deprives it of the necessary political cover to be considered a serious step forward, especially since various institutions within the authority and the organization (and the president) have seen their legitimacy eroded amid the failure to hold elections for several terms, and the failure to achieve any accomplishment, but the failure of the Oslo Agreement (1993) and the negotiation option, and the inability of resistance to achieve liberation or progress towards it. Secondly, the decree ignored urgent national priorities, foremost among them halting genocide and displacement, reconstruction, addressing annexation and liquidation plans, and providing the means for resilience and survival for the cause and the people. It also ignored the necessity of forming a unified national leadership and formulating a comprehensive Palestinian strategy to face existential challenges and risks and harness available opportunities.

It is not understandable how elections can be held in Gaza amid bombardment, destruction, massacres, siege, starvation, and thirst, or in the West Bank amidst creeping annexation, settlements, dismemberment, arrests, settler assaults, and dismantling the components of the national existence to the extent that even the authority is being undermined because it embodies national identity and keeps the door for establishing the Palestinian state open. Even if a ceasefire deal is reached, there is no guarantee that this deal will lead to a permanent ceasefire or a real Israeli withdrawal, as the occupation will continue its aggression and maintain security control, seeking to replicate the West Bank and Lebanon model after the ceasefire agreement.

An Israeli attempt to undermine the Palestinian Authority because it embodies national identity and keeps the door for establishing the Palestinian state open.

Among the major criticisms is that the decree conditions the participants' commitment to the PLO program and obligations and international legitimacy, in blatant violation of the essence of the democratic process that is based on competition among multiple forces and programs within a unified national framework. What is required is not to impose a political program on others, as programs, alliances, and policies change with changing circumstances, but rather the most important thing is to agree on a binding national charter that serves as a constitution until a constitution for the State of Palestine is established, based on the unity of land, people, cause, and narrative, deriving legitimacy from the national legacy and fundamental rights, articulated in a legal, political, and universal humanitarian language, and considering the best and utmost that can be achieved without compromising the national cause and fundamental rights, pending a reconsideration of the current national charter that has been emptied of its content due to the initiation of its amendment without completing the process. The solution exists: applying what was previously agreed upon through national consensus, relying on the amended basic law, the declaration of independence, and the organization’s foundational system when elections are held, without additions that would prevent the participation of essential factions in the elections.

In conclusion, the reference to elections for the National Council, while ignoring presidential and legislative elections, may be interpreted as prioritizing the organization, and the intention is to favor the state over the authority, which is, in itself, positive, as the authority is subject to agreements and unjust constraints. The state, on the other hand, embodies the right to self-determination, international law, and UN resolutions, which is a non-negotiable right; negotiations aim to implement it, not to negotiate over it. If the decree came in this context and within a comprehensive review aimed at rebuilding the organization and activating its institutions on democratic bases, opening its doors to all forces and currents that believe in partnership, away from exclusion, treason, and monopoly... if the decree had come in this context, it would be welcome. However, if this step turns into a means to exclude those who do not agree with the official program that has hit a dead end a long time ago or to reproduce the old formula that relied on appointments based on a factional quota system, it will only deepen the Palestinian predicament.