What are Egypt's Options Following the Inauguration of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam?

SadaNews - With its official inauguration today, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam marks a new historical phase in the water equation of the Nile River between Cairo, Khartoum, and Addis Ababa, following marathon negotiations that have been ongoing since its construction began in 2011. However, they failed to reach consensus solutions, raising questions about the future of water security for Egypt and Sudan.

The opening coincides with Egyptian and Sudanese efforts to revive the "Nile Basin Initiative" and return it to its consensus-based foundations, efforts that are based on a vision—rejected by Ethiopia—centered on principles of "consensus, prior notification, and no harm" when dealing with water projects on the Nile River.

Nearly 15 years ago, disputes arose between upstream countries and the two downstream countries with the signing of the "Entebbe Agreement" known as the "Cooperative Framework Agreement for the Nile Basin" in 2010, which was rejected by Cairo and Khartoum and was a major reason for their suspension from participating in the Nile Basin Initiative.

The Entebbe Agreement came into force in September 2024, following South Sudan's ratification, carrying controversial clauses, the most prominent of which include the redistribution of water and allowing upstream countries to implement water projects without consensus from the downstream countries.

In light of the official opening of the Ethiopian dam and the rising indications that it will not be the last Ethiopian dam on the Blue Nile (the main tributary of the Nile's water to Egypt), "Al Jazeera Net" seeks to answer five questions posed to Egyptian experts and observers that track the possible future paths available to Cairo in dealing with Ethiopia's attempts to impose a new equation on the Nile water system.

What are the "grave repercussions" that Egypt and Sudan fear from the Ethiopian dam?

According to the outcomes of the second round of the (2+2) consultative mechanism of the foreign and irrigation ministers of Egypt and Sudan, held last Wednesday, the most significant challenges include:

The ongoing threat to the stability of the situation in the eastern Nile basin.

The serious risks arising from Ethiopia's unilateral steps to fill and operate the dam.

The dangers related to the safety of the dam.

Unregulated water discharges.

Confronting drought conditions.

In light of passing the dam's filling periods—with minimal losses from an Egyptian perspective—the most prominent "negative" effects in the operation phase include:

The adverse impact on the water supplies flowing to Egypt, especially during periods of below-average flooding.

Filling the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam means cutting 15 billion cubic meters from the water share of Egypt and Sudan annually.

In the event of the dam's collapse, waters would inundate Lake Nasser (in southern Egypt), making it impossible to manage under high operational conditions or even emergency situations.

Approximately 24,000 square kilometers of agricultural land along the area between the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and Lake Nasser could be submerged.

Why do Egypt and Sudan refuse to involve the other basin countries in the dam issue?

The outcomes of the (2+2) mechanism emphasized that the Ethiopian dam issue remains between the three countries, rejecting any attempts to involve other basin countries in the contentious issue.

In his interpretation, Ambassador Salah Halima, former assistant foreign minister for African affairs, and vice president of the Egyptian Council for African Affairs (NGO), believes that Ethiopia deliberately seeks to drag the remaining basin countries not concerned with the Blue Nile into the dam file, despite all historical agreements governing this river being limited to Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia.

Diaa Qosai, former advisor to the irrigation minister, agrees, emphasizing that the Egyptian-Sudanese position is primarily based on rejecting the Entebbe Agreement, which Addis Ababa uses as a tool to "incite" other basin countries against the downstream countries, even though they are not directly involved with the Blue Nile.

What are the chances of successfully returning the "Nile Basin Initiative" to its consensus foundations?

The (2+2) mechanism confirmed Egypt and Sudan's commitment to returning the "Nile Basin Initiative" to its consensus-based foundations, which is considered a fundamental pillar for water cooperation and achieving benefits for all the basin countries.

Qosai sees that the initiative has not been outdated, pointing to increasing rapprochement between Cairo and several influential countries in the basin, such as Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which strengthens Egypt's position in the face of Ethiopian obstinacy.

He considered that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has failed to achieve its declared goals, as it has only generated 1,800 megawatts out of the targeted 5,600 through only 6 turbines out of 16 planned to be operated, which may weaken Addis Ababa's position and give Cairo a broader margin to maneuver with the basin partners who had relied on inexpensive electricity from Ethiopia but have reconsidered after the project's setbacks, he said.

For his part, Ambassador Halima rejected saying that the Nile Basin Initiative has been outdated, clarifying that its essence is based on "consensus and prior notification," which aligns with the interests of the downstream countries, noting that the Egyptian-Sudanese movements under the (2+2) mechanism aim to return the initiative to the negotiating table and address the shortcomings that marred the Entebbe Agreement.

Former irrigation minister Nasr Allam further noted that the core knot lies not in the countries of the East African lakes plateau but in the obstinate Ethiopian stance, emphasizing that Egypt and Sudan's relations with the rest of the basin countries are good and supported by development projects, but Cairo's return to the initiative is contingent on the signatory countries retracting the Entebbe Agreement.

He stressed that the initiative has not yet outlived its role, provided that the principles of consensus and non-harm are adhered to, while also warning against Ethiopia's attempts to exploit it to rally the basin countries against Egypt and Sudan, which he described as "political provocations" that do not change the facts of international law.

What options are available to Egypt in dealing with the official inauguration of the dam?

Cairo has affirmed for years its right to defend its water security and take necessary measures to achieve that, starting from its demand for a binding legal agreement for filling and operating the dam, leading to hinting at military options and resorting to the United Nations Security Council, but these moves have not achieved breakthroughs.

At the same time, Egypt has started implementing national projects to rationalize water use, including the national water resources and irrigation plan (water security for all 2050).

Former Minister Allam believes that Egyptian options depend on whether the dam will indeed affect Egypt's water share, clarifying that if it causes harm, Cairo will defend its interests as determined by the Egyptian regime, a right guaranteed by international laws.

He also warned that upcoming drought periods could lead to "direct confrontations" that neither Egypt nor the international community desires, calling for an agreement that balances international law and the interests of the Nile Basin peoples.

He criticized what was raised about Sudan signing a unilateral technical agreement with Ethiopia in 2022 regarding the filling and operation of the dam, considering it "a mistake against Egypt," and called for an Egyptian stance to respond to this position and clarify its legal validity.

Ambassador Salah Halima considered that the unilateral inauguration and operation of the dam represents a breach of international law and a direct threat to the water and existential security of Egypt and Sudan, not only during drought periods but also in light of potential dam failures due to the absence of safety standards.

He confirmed that Egypt still enjoys broad international support, citing a previous statement from the Security Council calling for reaching a binding agreement within a short period, adding that Cairo retains its legitimate right to defend its water security by all legitimate means, including self-defense, while keeping the option of returning to the Security Council open, whether under Chapter Six (peaceful solutions through negotiation and mediation) or Chapter Seven, which provides for measures that may reach military intervention to protect international peace and security.

For his part, Qosai emphasized that the solution lies solely in a tripartite agreement on the management and operation of the dam, which Addis Ababa refuses so far, warning that the continuation of Ethiopian obstinacy may place the two countries in a "drought and thirst or drowning and flooding" equation, which may eventually push them to resort to "rough measures" after exhausting all diplomatic avenues and international mediations.

Will the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam be the last Ethiopian dam on the Blue Nile?

A few days ago, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed confirmed that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is just the beginning of other dams. International academic estimates have also previously revealed that the dam does not represent the last Ethiopian water projects on the Blue Nile, and there are future plans to build additional dams, but financial and political constraints make their execution difficult in the foreseeable future, as building dams requires economic conditions and stability that may take decades to achieve.

In this context, Ambassador Halima explained that the existence of plans to construct additional dams cannot be ignored, stressing that Cairo and Khartoum would not accept a repetition of Ethiopian scenarios of imposing facts on the ground. He also clarified that any move to build future dams must come within the framework of a binding agreement that preserves the interests of the three countries and prevents jeopardizing Egypt and Sudan's water security.

As for advisor Qosai, he went further, stating that Egypt will not allow Ethiopia to impose a new "template" on the Blue Nile, considering that any additional project would pose a serious threat to the water security of Egypt and Sudan.