Netanyahu and the Second Phase: Between Halting Progress and the Test of the Palestinian Role

The statements of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his conditions for the second phase of any agreement cannot be understood outside the political context within which he operates, nor outside his deep awareness of the nature of the current moment: a moment of transition from an open war logic to the logic of managing the aftermath of genocide. This transition is one that Netanyahu is trying to disrupt or empty of its political content as much as possible.

Netanyahu views the second phase as a political threat rather than a negotiation entitlement. If this phase is to see progress, it would mean opening files on withdrawal, reconstruction, and rearranging the situation in the Gaza Strip, shifting the focus from killing and destruction to implementing the terms of the agreement through political discourse.

This is why Netanyahu is keen to impose a clear equation: no reconstruction before disarmament, and no political progress before establishing the "security reality" enforced by war. This equation does not aim, practically, at disarmament so much as it intends to keep Gaza in a perpetual state of suspension—neither war, nor peace, nor genuine reconstruction.

Within Israel, Netanyahu does not appear to be cornered as is often suggested. Various political factions, from the far right to the center, converge on one point: a reluctance to make any significant change to the status quo. Thus, Gaza becomes a file for internal bidding, and freezing the situation becomes a comfortable option for all.

The hope for decisive American pressure seems, so far, to rest on weak foundations. The experience of the first phase showed that the Trump administration, despite its "serious" rhetoric, does not exert actual pressure on Netanyahu, but rather settles for balancing acts. The limited nature of this pressure itself may drive increasing Israeli concern, revealed by right-wing media campaigns against Kushner and Wietkoff, out of fear that Trump’s surroundings could become a pressure factor pushing towards achieving the second phase, including the start of reconstruction in parallel with the disarmament process, rather than as a prerequisite, which would make the Palestinian timing a decisive factor in cornering Netanyahu, not Gaza.

Real pressure can only be created in one scenario: if the American administration positions itself in a political corner by presenting a coherent Palestinian vision, particularly from Hamas, for the second phase, backed by mediators, so that Israeli obstruction becomes an American burden that cannot be ignored.

This explains the sensitivity of timing and the importance of not allowing Netanyahu to rearrange his internal cards (the budget law, or the Haredi law, the coalition safety net, and the weapon of dissolving the Knesset) before a counter-pressure equation takes shape.

In light of these data, it can be said that progress in the second phase is not only stalled because of Israel, while affirming that the responsibility here is not equal and does not resemble between the occupier and the party under genocide; it may also be an accusation against the Palestinians due to the absence of a clear Palestinian political initiative. The continuation of ambiguity gives Netanyahu additional time and transforms the "upcoming phase" into merely an extension of the current phase with different tools.

Most dangerously, delaying the political transition allows Israel to impose new realities under the titles of "conditional reconstruction," "new maps," "security areas," and reconstruction projects linked to external investment interests, rather than to the rights of the Palestinian population.

Here arises the fundamental question: what is the required Palestinian role at this moment? The role is no longer limited to resilience or crisis management; it requires presenting a comprehensive vision for the second phase, encompassing reconstruction, managing Gaza, security arrangements, and the political dimension, by stripping Israeli pretexts and embarrassing international parties, treating reconstruction as a sovereign battle; because rebuilding is not merely a technical or humanitarian file, but a battlefield over land, ownership, and the future shape and identity of the Gaza Strip. Any vacuum here will be filled either by Israel or internationally at the expense of the Palestinians.

Investing in international and regional fissures passes through transforming the Gaza Strip from a negotiating burden into a test case for the international community: is it a partner in restoring life, or a partner in managing the aftermath of genocide? Despite the enormity of the destruction, the moment after the genocide opens a rare window for rebuilding Gaza nationally and politically, not just structurally. But this opportunity is not given; it is seized.

Giving Netanyahu the initiative means reproducing the siege in a "soft" form, turning reconstruction into a tool of political control, and cementing the results of war as a fait accompli. Real progress begins when Palestinians recognize that the second phase is not an extension of the confrontation, but a new arena for it—an arena where the battle is managed not only by clinging to what conditions were before, but by maps, narrative, and time.

The dilemma today is not in Netanyahu's intentions, which are clear, nor in Trump’s hesitation, which is expected, but in the internal Palestinian question: do we want to manage the aftermath of genocide, or change its rules? The answer to this question will determine whether the upcoming phase is a step towards rebuilding Gaza and opening a political horizon, or merely a short respite in the path of ongoing genocide with other tools.