The Government and the Transitional Administration in the Gaza Strip

There is no doubt that the Palestinian government plays a significant role in managing aid and providing services to Palestinian citizens in the Gaza Strip within the framework of recovery, continuously coordinating with UN and international partner institutions, donor countries, and entities in implementing coordinated and integrated interventions; this is achieved through the government operations room to save thousands of displaced families, secure alternative and safe shelters, and provide essential supplies to prevent the worsening of the humanitarian disaster that the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip are experiencing.

Contributing to alleviating burdens in these circumstances, following the crime of genocide committed against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, is a sacred duty that is beyond debate; regardless of the size and type of contribution or participation in managing, organizing, or delivering these contributions, it is a valued effort for the continuation of life for the residents. However, this effort remains temporary and relates to services that can be provided by various governmental and community parties, and does not address the future of the Gaza Strip with the return of the Palestinian government to manage Gaza and the end of institutional division.

This raises a fundamental question about the policy of the government/national authority adopted to deal with the management of the transitional administration in Gaza and the relationship with the bodies established under Security Council Resolution 2803, and planning for the post-transitional phase, which is supposed to end by the end of 2027; proactive planning here aims to impose a reality in Gaza in which the government possesses the initiative and the ability to establish future governance systems to unify the West Bank and Gaza together, and to prevent the Peace Council or any other body from continuing to manage the transitional government in a way that renders the possibility of extending it absent.

In my opinion, the work within the broader context takes two directions: the first pertains to implementing the conditional issues existing in Security Council Resolution 2803 related to the required reforms from the Palestinian Authority, which itself has made written promises and commitments therein, "until the Palestinian Authority satisfactorily completes its reform program as mentioned in various proposals, including President Trump's 2020 peace plan and the Saudi-French proposal, allowing it to regain control over Gaza safely and effectively."

The second direction: adopting a government strategy to deal with the transitional administration in which its interventions are clarified, benefiting from the Palestinian Authority employees present in the Gaza Strip, and the nature of the coordination relationship between the Palestinian government bodies in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank on one hand, and the National Committee for the Management of Gaza "the technocrat committee" on the other; including the extent of information, records, spatial planning, international aid, and plans or strategies for reconstruction to contribute to revitalizing life in the Gaza Strip and the required recovery, enabling the government to store a systematic and effective management of governance in Gaza upon the completion of the transitional phase, and preventing the possibility of extending this administration after the end of the international mandate at the end of 2027.