Did We Lose India?

The question is neither emotional nor answered with a slogan. India is not a marginal country in the international system, nor is its position a trivial detail in the Palestinian cause. We are talking about a country with over 1.4 billion people, a nuclear power, and an economy on track to become one of the three largest in the world. Therefore, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Israel and his speech before the Knesset cannot be read as a mere protocol event or a diplomatic courtesy; rather, it represents a significant political shift that raises a direct question: Did the Palestinians lose India?

The answer is not an absolute yes, nor a comfortable no. Historically, the India we knew—Nehru's India, Indira Gandhi's India, and the Non-Aligned Movement—was not a country that was "solidarity" with Palestine merely out of ethics, but from experience. A country that emerged from colonialism understood the meaning of occupation and long stood with the right of peoples to self-determination. Palestine was part of its political consciousness, not a secondary item in its foreign discourse.

Modi's speech before the Knesset was not a speech of balance or an attempt to straddle the fence. It was a clear alignment. Solely condolences to Israel, praise for its "determination and courage", an absolute condemnation of the October 7 attack without any mention of the massacres in Gaza, and then praise for Trump’s plan and the Abraham Accords… all this reflects a deliberate political choice, not a slip of the tongue or a fleeting courtesy.

The most concerning aspect of this shift is not the language used, but the structure behind it. Today, India is one of Israel's largest defense partners, with deep military and technological relations manifested in the signing of dozens of agreements and the opening of previously closed security systems. Israel does not see India merely as a market, but as a new strategic depth that reduces its almost total dependence on the United States at a time when its image is eroding within Western public opinion.

In contrast, India sees in Israel a partner that provides it with technological and security superiority in its regional conflicts, especially with Pakistan, and with the rise of "political Islam" discourse, which Modi's government perceives as a direct threat to its national project. Here, Palestine is automatically excluded from the center of attention, reduced to a rhetorical point mentioned as needed, without political substance or practical commitment.

It is true that Modi referred to "addressing the Palestinian issue", but the reference was technical, cold, devoid of any rights-related substance. He did not speak of occupation, settlement, blockade, or the killing of civilians. Palestine was present as a diplomatic decoration, not as a real political issue.

To avoid leaving the question theoretical, what is needed from the Palestinian side is to shift from a reactionary logic to an initiative logic. India today is governed by a strategic mindset that balances energy, security, technology, and markets. Therefore, addressing it should be in the language of interests, not emotional appeals. We need a clear vision of how Palestine can be a partner—even if limited—in areas that matter to New Delhi: emerging technology, higher education, smart agriculture, and health and pharmaceutical cooperation. Additionally, organized engagement with Indian think tanks, universities, and media, along with building bridges with various parties and currents, can help reinsert Palestine into the Indian internal discourse, not as a distant issue, but as a file linked to international law and the regional stability that India needs in its transcontinental projects.

Moreover, we need a multi-level diplomatic strategy: formal, parliamentary, academic, and popular. It is not enough to communicate only with the government; we must engage with the Indian private sector, communities, and cultural elites who still view Palestine as a cause of liberation and human dignity.

Restoring the relationship with India will not happen through recalling the past but by redefining the present: What do we offer, what do we seek, and how do we make Palestine a partner, not a burden, in the equation of Indian interests? Only then does the question of losing India become one that can be answered with action rather than lamentation.

A rapid and organized Palestinian diplomatic initiative is required, based on three parallel tracks: First, launching direct high-level political dialogue with New Delhi focused on shared interests and regional stability instead of relying on conventional statements; second, activating multi-channel diplomacy that includes the Indian parliament, think tanks, universities, and media to articulate the Palestinian narrative in the language of international law and strategic interests; and third, presenting concrete cooperation initiatives in areas that matter to India, such as technology, smart agriculture, and education, thereby redefining Palestine as an interactable partner rather than just a humanitarian file. Speed is crucial here because the vacuum is filled quickly, and any further delay will turn political distancing into a reality that is hard to amend.
Did we lose India? The more accurate statement is: We lost official India under Modi, but we have not lost all of India. There is still a divided Indian public opinion, academic and cultural elites that criticize this bias, and political forces—though weaker—view Palestine as a mirror to India’s historical experience. However, this margin will not operate alone, nor will it move automatically.

The deeper Palestinian problem is not solely India's shift, but our inability to read this shift in time and to develop the discourse and diplomatic tools that fit a world no longer governed solely by the logic of ethics. We continue to address rising powers in the language of the 1960s, while they move in the language of interests and solid alliances.

The real loss is not the loss of a specific state but the loss of time. The time we have delayed in redefining our position in a new international system and in building a discourse that transcends pleading, speaks in the language of interests, and addresses societies, not just governments.
Today, India is not the India of yesterday, just as Israel today is not the Israel of the 1990s. The most important question is no longer: Did we lose India? But: Do we have the capacity to restore our presence in a world that no longer resembles us and does not wait for us? The answer to this question will determine whether the loss of India is a fleeting moment... or a prelude to a series of larger losses.