Dismantling the Structure of the Israeli Project (The Demographic Issue)
Articles

Dismantling the Structure of the Israeli Project (The Demographic Issue)

In the previous article, we mentioned that something is unraveling in the occupying state, and we noted that we would begin in this article by attempting to reveal and address the manifestations of this unraveling.

If we may consider the "Sharm El-Sheikh Agreement" as an agreement that will end the aggressive war at a certain level of its transition to the second and third stages, and that it will ultimately lead to a halt to the genocide in the form, pace, and brutality that it was carried out until the ceasefire began, it can be inferred that the plan for uprooting has failed, and that the issue of deportation has transformed into subsidiary and branched plans, and that it is no longer a feasible goal as the American administration had planned, nor as the occupying state sought to achieve through all means and methods, with criminality that has surpassed every limitation and has crazily exceeded all types of boundaries.

We will begin from what has been presented to discuss and address the demographic issue as one of the forms of the manifestation of the disintegration of the Israeli state structure, which, in reality, means the disintegration of the Zionist project structure on Palestinian land.

As is known, the demographic issue represents a fundamental pillar of the Zionist project, as it is the organic link between the concepts of uprooting and settlement, and represents a systematic replacement mechanism within this pillar.

There are, as is also known, hundreds of books, studies, articles, and investigations that have addressed the demographic issue, not to mention a huge amount of secret and semi-secret information and data that is presented to political levels and relevant institutions in the form of limited distribution special reports in the occupying state.

What concerns us is the newness of this issue in terms of the pace of deepening the Israeli crisis, in terms of the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of this crisis, and in terms of its transformation from an oscillating nature, either rising or falling, to a new qualitative nature, which has become a trend after it was merely a fluctuation of tendencies, or merely oscillations in the gap between immigration to the entity and immigration from it, or what is called reverse immigration.

It can be pointed out, with a high degree of confidence and certainty, that this transformation has become an established reality that will be difficult to revert to what it was before the "Flood of Al-Aqsa".

According to official Israeli reports, disclosed by the "Immigration Committee" in the Knesset, the gap between new arrivals and those leaving without return has exceeded 150,000, and this large, even massive gap is a new and unprecedented phenomenon.

The actual numbers, independent of the "disclosure" by the committee, have turned into a puzzle through which real figures conflict and provoke a debate indicating that the actual numbers, and not the official reports, have become some of the most important "state secrets" and that they have reached a level of danger and sensitivity that makes them closer to a "national threat" or a direct threat to one of the most significant anchors of the Zionist project in the reality of the occupying state.

This is only regarding the gap, meaning that those who have left the occupying state have become 150,000 more than those who have arrived, and this means that this huge gap in official figures may be much larger if we take into account the "concealment" of these numbers associated with the considerations we mentioned of the dangerous moral impact on the public and the issue of the threat and challenge that this gap represents. As for the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of those leaving and arriving, the issue is of great significance.

Some data indicates that those leaving without return are from the youth category, and that the majority of them belong to the most qualified sectors in general, with this majority concentrated in pioneering economic sectors, particularly in the information and communications technology sector.

The departure of tens of thousands of highly qualified youth is considered a tremendous human and economic drain by all standards, especially since this departure leads directly to the emigration of the investments in which these youths were working.

The reality in this regard is that we are talking about a political and economic disaster for the future of the Israeli economy in terms of the qualitative relative advantages of this economy, and it is a major blow to the attraction power that the occupying state used to enjoy in this regard.

This disaster manifests itself as a true tragedy when we compare the quantity of "new arrivals" with the qualitative level of qualifications of these arrivals, and the type of work they can engage in.

The data here indicates that the majority of them are from the religious groups, and that the jobs they can undertake are simple and marginal jobs, and perhaps - which is more likely - they prefer to join religious schools and institutes to engage in "prayers", evade military service, and become burdens on the budget of the occupying state without any compensation or returns.

Thus, when the occupying state loses its most qualified groups and receives in return parasitic groups that live and thrive on the state budget without any compensation, the catastrophic and tragic face of this immigration becomes very clear.

This is not the only issue, as this matter will certainly reflect on the mobilization capacity of the Israeli occupying army, which suffers, as is announced and known, from a severe shortage in its human resources. Additionally, the joining of large segments of these "new arrivals" to religious schools, and to simple and marginal jobs will exacerbate the "Haredim crisis" in both the state and Israeli society, which is already exacerbating and could explode widely at any coming moment.

The bleakness of the Israeli scene increases when you realize that the reserve soldiers in the occupying army are in an extremely poor mobilization status according to the official Israeli data itself.

In this context, also, the recent data published in Israeli media about the inability of nearly 50% of reserve soldiers who "served" in the army during this barbaric war to return to their jobs smoothly or normally, in addition to the emergence of severe cases of isolation, depression, feelings of despair and frustration, and dangerous degrees of obsessions, and episodes of acute stress due to the inability to communicate with their workplace, family, and relationships prior to the aggressive war.

And if we add to all this the onset of the "drain" of the Jewish "vessel" for this immigration, and the emergence of Jewish organizations at the global level calling for a complete disavowal of the genocide war being waged by the occupying state against the Palestinian people, especially in Western countries, and particularly the [Not in Our Name] movement, as well as the high courage in leading these organizations in the global uprising that raises the slogan of freedom for Palestine high, it warns of new facets of the tragedy and darkness that the colonial entity is experiencing.

It is not yet clear how the occupying state will handle this escalating crisis, and it seems that certain sectors of the "fascist right" are comfortable with the quality of these "arrivals" for what they might represent as a "herd" for them, as it appears that the emigrating groups from the occupying state do not concern the more reactionary factions of this "right" since they are closer to "secularism" than to "religious Zionism".

The demographic issue, then, becomes a strategy to turn life in the Gaza Strip into a social impossibility "to stimulate" deportation and uprooting, and they continue on the same approach in the West Bank, as they still bet on keeping the separation between the West Bank and the Strip to alleviate the demographic issue. But there has been no real benefit so far.

So did this war lead to reverse deportation? And has deportation become an Israeli dilemma more than it is a Palestinian dilemma? Has the spell turned back on the sorcerer?

This article expresses the opinion of its author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of Sada News Agency.