Crossroads of Syrian History

Author: رامي منصور

Public communication with Israel by the new regime in Damascus or by Syrian Druze leaders is no longer met with rejection or condemnation. The meeting between the Syrian Foreign Minister and an Israeli Minister has become a passing and ordinary news item, and it seems that the misery of the Arab situation, including that of Syria, has made these meetings less reprehensible than they were once considered in Syria.

In fact, relations between Israel and Syrian leaders are not new; they date back to pre-independence Syria, where the National Block in Damascus, the central political current at that time, held official communications and meetings with representatives from the Jewish Agency in the 1930s. The Zionist intelligence even enlisted agents from the ranks of the National Block. Likewise, the relations between the Jewish Agency and the Druze Mountain are not new, having emerged since the mid-1930s through characters from Palestinian Druze, aimed at preventing Druze youths from participating in the fighting alongside the Great Palestinian Revolution against the British mandate and the Zionist project.

Great illusions were woven around these communications and relations, just as is happening today. For example, the National Block relied on establishing relations with the Jewish Agency in Palestine, claiming to exploit Jewish political and economic influence in Western capitals, under the pretext of their control over Western media, and that engaging with the Jewish Agency, even at the expense of the rights of the Arab Palestinian people, serves the goal of Syrian independence. However, the Zionist objectives of these communications were opposite. The Zionist movement aimed to suppress the Great Palestinian Revolution, block Syrian support for the revolution with men and arms, create a rift between the Syrian national movement and the Palestinian national movement, and assist in the displacement of Palestinians to Iraq and elsewhere, with the goal of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. Furthermore, the Jewish Agency opposed Syrian independence and sought to geographically fragment it through sectarian alliances.

The same is true in the Druze Mountain, as Dr. Mahmoud Mohareb provides in his book "The Secret Relations between the Jewish Agency and Syrian Leaders during the Great Palestinian Revolution" (Jusour for Translation and Publishing, Beirut, 2021) multiple official Zionist documents that document those relations in the 1930s, which were built on fantasies from some Druze Arab leaders about the possibility of the Jewish Agency assisting Syrian Druze in establishing a self-governed administration through Jewish influence in the West, providing economic aid to poor Druze villages, developing agriculture by offering agricultural advisers, and even attempting to involve Sultan Pasha Al-Atrash in a project to displace Palestinians Druze to the Druze Mountain in exchange for money, by fabricating a sectarian tension between Palestinian revolutionaries and Druze villages.

However, the Zionist aim of these relations was not to develop the Druze villages in the mountain or to enhance agriculture and economy, but to prevent Druze youths from joining the Palestinian revolution, to have the Druze accept the Zionist project at the expense of Palestinian rights, and to displace ten thousand Druze from Palestine to the Druze Mountain by purchasing their lands. The plan for displacement failed for two main reasons: the inability of the Jewish Agency to fund it during World War II, as the condition for displacement was to establish alternative villages for the Druze in the mountain and purchase their lands in Palestine, and the rejection of most Druze in Palestine of the displacement, which thwarted the plan.

It is as if history is repeating itself; the Syrian National Block gained nothing from its cooperation with the Jewish Agency, except for some money for those who were recruited to work for the Zionist movement. The Jewish Agency did not use its influence in the West to support Syrian independence; on the contrary. The Druze Mountain benefited nothing from these relations and great illusions, remaining in the same condition as it was at that time.

If Ahmed Al-Shara is negotiating publicly with Israel to avoid its harm and to increase the legitimacy of his rule in the West, and if the previous regime negotiated with Israel officially and publicly, the National Block did this before him in the 1930s and did not gain the favor of the West or escape Zionist ambitions in the Arab Mashreq. Rather, its repercussions were catastrophic for the Arabs in the 1948 war, concerning the extent of the Zionist infiltration of Syria and its elites and media; the Zionist movement planted 280 articles in Syrian newspapers during that period and owned five Syrian and Lebanese newspapers to promote the Zionist project and create a rift between Syrians and the Palestinian revolution, as documented in Dr. Mahmoud Mohareb's book.

If Sheikh Al-Hajri is building illusions based on communications with Israel, believing that Israel will support self-governance for the Druze Mountain and provide it with economic and security support, then he should draw lessons from the experience of the 1930s. The aim of the Zionist movement in that period of communication with the "Druze people," as Abu Hashi wrote, was not to support the "Right of Self-determination" but to create a rift between Syrians and the Palestinian national movement and to pave the way for the displacement of Palestinian Druze to the mountain. Ironically, all this happened through intermediaries from Palestinian Druze, who believed that the success of the Zionist movement in establishing a prosperous Jewish economy in Palestine would be replicated in the Druze Mountain. Yet, the Druze Mountain remains in poverty after nearly a decade of delays.

If Al-Shara’s negotiations with Israel are conducted as the head of a state with its lands occupied, and states negotiate with even the occupied state, Sheikh Al-Hajri communicates with Israel as a religious leader and not as a statesman. This is a significant difference. In conclusion, Israel will not withdraw from the occupied Syrian lands and will not transfer them to what it considers to be a jihadist Salafi regime, but will insist that these lands remain under Israeli security influence in southern Syria, nor will it fight the "Druze war" in Syria.

It appears as if nothing has changed; Syrian leaders from various factions seek to ingratiate themselves with Israel in hopes of exploiting Jewish influence in the West for their benefit, just as many Arab leaders seek to placate the United States. Similarly, "minority leaders" seek to ingratiate themselves with Israel for economic and financial development and protection. All are illusions.

The Syrian block did not achieve independence through its willingness to collaborate with the Zionist movement at the expense of Palestinian rights, nor did the Druze Mountain achieve self-governance and agricultural and economic development through communicating with the Jewish Agency.

Say it is naivety; the belief that negotiating with Israel is the way to the hearts and minds of the West and to gain legitimacy and economic development. Say it is ignorance, narrow-mindedness, and lack of resources. The experience of the 1930s in negotiating with the Jewish Agency did not support Syrian independence, nor Druze self-governance, nor "Druze economy;" rather, it was the positions of the Druze in supporting their national struggle against French occupation and for independence, as patriotic Syrians, that elevated their status in Syrian history. The persecution of the Druze is a Syrian issue, not merely a Druze issue.

Finally, I presented this article to ChatGPT and asked for a discussion with it, which concluded with the following:

Recommendations and Proposals

- The necessity of enhancing political national awareness and dismantling illusions about the possibility of relying on temporary solutions with external forces.

- Supporting policies that enhance economic and sovereign independence, away from granting opportunities for exploitation or penetration.

- Honoring national struggle and resistance, not complicity or unlimited negotiations that will only lead to a repetition of historical mistakes.

- The need to understand the historical and political dimensions of every decision, especially regarding negotiations with occupying or foreign powers.

Based on the aforementioned proposals and recommendations by ChatGPT, the matter can be summarized concerning three players in the Syrian Druze issue: The new regime in Damascus should deal with the Druze as Syrian citizens, not as a sect to be disciplined and subjugated through unleashing armed factions to commit horrific massacres; that turning Israel’s occupation of Syrian land into a matter of bilateral security negotiations subject to the current balance of power weakens the Syrian side and places it under threat and blackmail from Israel by neutralizing society and international law; and that the Druze religious leadership, particularly Al-Hajri, should maintain the national reputation of the Druze and their historical stances in Syria, avoiding entanglement in regional projects that contradict the Druze’s national identity and interests as a group and as Syrian citizens, and that opposition to the regime and its doctrine, considering them "Daesh" in Al-Hajri's eyes, should not turn into hostility towards the Syrian state; and that the Druze leaders in Palestine must respect the patriotism of their Syrian brothers as Syrians and not as a sect, as converting Druze identity into a national identity exacerbates the danger they face, both in Syria and in the Arab world, as they are seen as advocates of division and fragmentation, which is utterly incorrect; instead of emphasizing the demand for the unity of Syria based on equal citizenship for all.