Weapons Depots in Northern Syria: Between Power Management and the Danger of Influence

Until the beginning of 2025, the power dynamics in northern Syria stabilized into a more disciplined equation compared to the previous chaotic period marked by conflicts between armed factions, due to differing affiliations and funding sources. The Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which led the joint operations room that ousted the Assad regime in December 2024, solidified its control over Idlib and parts of the countryside of Hama, Aleppo, and Latakia through a comprehensive governance and security system consisting of police forces, intelligence branches, and an organized military structure. This was supported by a process of integrating local factions into larger formations, marketed as a new Syrian army project, to reduce the duality of military command and arms.

Alongside it, smaller or allied factions such as the Army of Honor, Ahrar al-Sham, and components of the National Liberation Front operate, while foreign fighters, led by the Turkestan Islamic Party and remnants of jihadist Salafist groups like Guardians of Religion and Supporters of Monotheism, remain.

The arms economy in Idlib during this period remained reliant on intricate smuggling and supply networks connecting the local market to external sources. Weapons enter through informal routes from the Turkish border or through recycling old stockpiles from other fronts, in addition to local manufacturing of ammunition and explosives through small workshops managed by factions or their affiliated entities, which has created a parallel market where the trade of ammunition is used as a tool for financing and political influence.

Recently, cases of weapon depot explosions in northern Syria have become more frequent amid an urgent need to reorganize the military and political landscape in the north, specifically in Idlib, where factions and brigades that were effective in the path of the armed Syrian opposition during the Assad regime's phase are now outside the calculations of the current and future stage, both in terms of military action and internal security operations.

These factions were a decisive instrument in overthrowing the regime, but they may now be viewed by the new administration as a security and political burden for several reasons, starting with their external affiliations, or their actual refusal to fall under a unified central military authority that oversees the general security scene, or their rejection of the idea of state monopoly on arms by principle.

Now, what matters is to view the explosion of ammunition depots in Idlib as part of an organized process to reshape the balance of military power, and to clear the arena of independent armed forces, which have now become non-state actors.

The nature of the weapons stored in Idlib until 2025 represents a diverse mixture reflecting this complex economy, including light and medium ammunition of calibers 7.62×39 and 7.62×54R, heavy machine guns of calibers 12.7, 14.5, and 23 mm, mortar shells of sizes 60, 82, and 120 mm, field artillery shells and Grad rockets (122 mm), in addition to explosive materials, detonators, and components of ready-to-assemble improvised explosive devices.

Some depots also contain parts for drones or aerial munitions acquired through limited smuggling channels or local manufacturing. The supply networks for this arsenal rely on a mix of external logistical support, purchases from regional black markets, and collecting war remnants from battlefields and rehabilitating them, making the storage sites sensitive centers directly linked to the military balance of the factions and their capacity to maneuver against their opponents, while simultaneously representing catastrophic vulnerabilities if targeted or poorly stored in a congested civilian environment.

Explosions, in general, are a tool for trimming influence and disarming in an indirect manner, by weakening the firepower of the factions without entering into open confrontations that might threaten an already fragile political stability. The new authority seeks to monopolize military power and considers the presence of independent weapon storage in the hands of brigades or parallel factions as a direct threat to monopolizing organized and regulated violence.

Let us not forget that Idlib is a model generalized to Syria, and adopting this model imposes cleaning the security structure from loose weapons, and allowing civil activities to emerge, after Idlib's reputation in the international community had been as a haven for groups classified on terrorism lists, Islamic factions, and a meeting point for foreign fighters.

Weakening the military and armament capacity of factions or any large independent armed individuals or formations is a necessary condition for enforcing civilian rule and rebuilding local institutions.

At a higher level, there is a group of external parties that supported the Idlib factions, whether they were Arab, regional, or Western channels. After ceasing support for the new administration, it is clear that the era of independent factions linked to external sponsors has ended, and the security map will be restructured according to the priorities of the new alliances and national interests, thus, cleaning this area goes through weakening the resources/draining the assets of these groups.

The nature of these explosions generally allows, which can be attributed to malfunctions, accidental incidents, or technical failures related to poor storage and high temperatures, provides a cover of denial, granting authorities in any country (not just in Syria concerning the Idlib scene) a wide margin to act without bearing the consequences of direct confrontations.

Frequently, local or allied intelligence agencies quietly carry out such operations as part of the redistribution of power balances on the ground. The same occurred between the Al-Furqan Brigade and the Western Rural Free Brigade in the countryside of Damascus and Quneitra, through carrying out mutual explosions of warehouses packed with light and medium weapons up to TOW missiles and others.

Most importantly, amidst the chatter regarding loyalties, funding, and supply, it cannot be excluded that some of these explosions result from conflicts between the factions themselves, as competing forces exploit the current political fluidity to settle scores or seize their opponents' resources before entering into any new arrangements.

The new administration may find in this inter-factional struggle a means of self-cleaning for the field, saving it effort and cost. In this sense, the recent explosions in weapons depots in Idlib seem to be part of a silent dismantling strategy aimed at neutralizing military forces that are no longer useful, and consolidating the authority of new civil and administrative institutions.